Is China Moving Towards “Enlightened” But Plutocratic Authoritarianism? by Cabestan, Jean-Pierre
 China Perspectives 
55 | september - october 2004
Varia
Is China Moving Towards “Enlightened” But
Plutocratic Authoritarianism?
Jean-Pierre Cabestan
Electronic version
URL: http://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/412
DOI: 10.4000/chinaperspectives.412
ISSN: 1996-4617
Publisher
Centre d'étude français sur la Chine contemporaine
Printed version
Date of publication: 1 October 2004
ISSN: 2070-3449
 
Electronic reference
Jean-Pierre Cabestan, « Is China Moving Towards “Enlightened” But Plutocratic Authoritarianism? », 
China Perspectives [Online], 55 | september - october 2004, Online since 29 December 2008,
connection on 28 October 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/412  ; DOI :
10.4000/chinaperspectives.412 
This text was automatically generated on 28 October 2019.
© All rights reserved
Is China Moving Towards
“Enlightened” But Plutocratic
Authoritarianism?
Jean-Pierre Cabestan
EDITOR'S NOTE
Translated from the French original by Michael Black
1 What  does  the  future  hold  for  the  Chinese  political  regime?1 This  is  a  particularly
difficult question to answer, as China, more than many other countries, has evolved in
an atypical  way,  both when it  was  a  totalitarian state  and since  the  death of  Mao
Zedong, and especially since the end of the Cold War and of European communism2. For
a multiplicity of reasons its path has been different and is likely to continue to be. This
does not mean that any break with the present political system and, in particular, any
transition to democracy should be ruled out. One cannot help thinking that the present
political regime, directed by a single party which, despite all its metamorphoses, still
claims to be communist, will, eventually, disappear. But what will replace it? We know
that a democratic transition is clearly not envisaged by the current political leadership.
In  September  2004,  a  few  days  before  succeeding  Jiang  Zemin  at  the  head  of  the
country’s powerful Central Military Committee, did not Hu Jintao, head of the Party
and of the state declare that Western democracy was a “dead-end” for China?3 Pressure
in favour of greater liberalisation and even democratisation of the Chinese regime does
indeed exist, within the Communist Party (CP) as well, and it would be wrong to ignore
or overlook it. But what I would like to try to show here is the China’s great ability to
adapt—and therefore to resist—the Chinese CP, its leadership and its nomenklatura, as
an  institution  exercising  political  power  in  a  monopolistic  fashion  and  seeking  to
preserve this monopoly.
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2 Since  the  launching  of  reforms  in  1979,  this  adaptation  has  been  based  on  both  a
redefinition—in  reality  a  reduction—of  the  political  sphere,  and  an  undeniable
“modernisation” of the state and of its relations with society. For a number of reasons
which we will explore briefly, this successful adaptation4 is highly likely to continue in
the foreseeable future, which is to say in the medium term. This will allow the CP to
maintain  both  its  monopoly  on  politics  and  its  grip  on  the  essential  pillars  of  the
economy,  while  accepting  a  certain  number  of  compromises  with  society,  and
particularly  its  new  elites,  through  the  development  of  more  equitable  conflict
resolution institutions (legal arbitration and conciliation institutions), of more or less
institutionalised  systems  of  consultation  (people’s  congresses,  think  tanks,  opinion
polls) as well as through the setting up of proto-democratic mechanisms within the
apparatus  of  a  Party  where  promotion  will  remain  above  all  based  on  co-optation
mechanisms.
A more flexible authoritarianism
3 There is a preconceived idea about the present Chinese political system: while Chinese
society  has  undergone  profound  changes  under  an  onslaught  of  unprecedented
economic growth and opening up to the outside world, the state is supposed to have
remained immobile, unruffled and impassive, firmly maintaining a monopoly of
political power in the hands of the nomenklatura of the Communist Party, continuing to
tightly control any organised social  action and nipping in the bud, to use the term
favoured  by  Jiang  Zemin,  any  dissident  expression  it  deems  to  be  destabilising  or
irreverent. In short, the political system is supposed to have remained totalitarian5.
4 Yet since the death of Mao Zedong, and especially since the repression of Tiananmen
and  the  relaunching  of  economic  reforms  by  Deng  Xiaoping  in  1992,  the  state,  or
rather,  the  Party-state  which  officially  presides  over  China’s  destinies,  has  been
profoundly transformed. These metamorphoses seem to have been reforms desired and
taken on by the country’s  central  leadership with the sole aim of  perpetuating the
dictatorship of the CP by modernising and adapting it, at the best rate of “return on
investment”, to the new economic, social and international environment with which it
found itself confronted. There again, as we shall see, this environment has played a
more direct and clearer role in the changes involved than is often believed.
5 It is clear that the political and institutional foundations of the system established by
Mao Zedong in 1949 have not been formally called into question. Nevertheless, with the
death of  Mao in 1976,  the return of  Deng Xiaoping to power,  and the launching of
reforms at the end of 1978, it seems to me that China emerged from totalitarianism and
entered an era which some have called post-totalitarian, and others authoritarian. The
end of the mass movements, the decline of ideology, the stabilisation of the workings of
the institutions as well as the partial and gradual withdrawal of the Party-state from
the economic and social spheres, are the aspects of this major change most frequently
mentioned6.  Seeking  to  take  into  account  the  desired  and  perverse  effects  of  the
spreading of power within the nomenklatura, both vertically (decentralisation in favour
of  provincial,  and  then  municipal  authorities)  and  horizontally  (collegial
administration, limiting the holding of more than one office at a time, restoration of
the formal  institutions of  state),  commentators  such as  Michel  Oksenberg,  Kenneth
Lieberthal  and  David  Lampton  have  applied  to  China  the  concept  of  “fragmented
authoritarianism”7.  For  my part,  the evolution of  the system since Tiananmen,  and
above all the relaunching of economic reforms by Deng Xiaoping in 1992, along with
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the limited and controlled liberalisation begun under Jiang Zemin and continued by Hu
Jintao, have led me to prefer the concept of “soft authoritarianism”, thus deliberately
establishing a parallel with Taiwan in the 1970s8.
6 This  working  hypothesis  does  not  in  any  way  prejudge  a  similar  evolution  of  the
People’s Republic towards democracy, say in a decade from now: on the contrary, a
comparison  between  the  two  states,  as  we  shall  see,  allows  glimpses  of  future
progressions which will  probably be very different.  The widely differing ideological
foundations of the two political systems (one Soviet, the other liberal), the persistence
on the mainland of institutions which are still impregnated with totalitarian culture
(such as Public Security, or to a lesser extent, the propaganda organs of the Party), the
determination of the CP to maintain its tight control over the essential segments of the
economy, and particularly in industry (and this despite the relative size of the public
sector in Taiwan up to the 1990s),  even the simple differences in geographical  and
human  scale  or  the  level  of  average  development  of  the  two  entities  under
consideration militate in this direction. At the same time, the shared culture, and in
particular the political and legal culture, in both societies, the following by both of the
ruling parties (the CP and the Kuomintang) of the organisational principles of Leninism,
the gradual privatisation, the opening up to the outside world as well as the general
and rapid growth of the mainland’s economy, are all  particulars which invite us to
make comparisons.
7 The obvious and well-known limitation of the concepts of post-totalitarianism or of
authoritarianism, soft or fragmented, is,  as with the notion of totalitarianism, their
static character. These notions do not make it possible to embrace those factors which
force the system to evolve,  and which concern us  particularly  here.  To Oksenberg,
there were four: the individual answers and the ad hoc solutions by the Party to the
structural  changes  it  has  brought  about,  the  opening  up  to  the  outside  world,  the
emergence  of  a  proto-market  economy,  and the  transformation of  communications
(the  Internet)  and  transport9.  We  could  add  other  factors  such  as  the  increasing
demands of society, whether these come from the victims or the beneficiaries of the
reforms, as well as the appearance of a private entrepreneurial class (whether de facto
or  legally  private,  one  should  stipulate)  which  maintains  close  but  increasingly
complex links with the political leadership10. Whatever is the case, all these evolutions
have favoured a general transformation, an adaptation of the Party-state and of the
political system which I would be tempted to designate by the deliberately vague and
apparently neutral term of “modernisation”.
A “modernised”, but only partially institutionalised authoritarianism
8 This modernisation of the Party-state is evidently not the “fifth modernisation” wished
for by Wei Jingsheng in 1979 (i.e. democracy); it does not therefore include the idea of
democratisation.  But  it  encompasses  a  reality  which  is  also  outside  of  the  “four
modernisations” announced by Zhou Enlai in 1975 (agriculture, industry, science and
technology, and national defence) and taken up by Deng in 1978. It affects the political
system, its structures, and its cadres, governmental and judicial institutions, the law,
and the relations which the state maintains with society.
9 This  modernisation  of  the  political  system  is  evidently  not  neutral:  it  consists  of
adapting the state as well as possible to the new environment without having to call
directly  into  question the  monopolistic  power  exercised  by  the  CP in  the  political,
administrative (civil and military), and judicial spheres. It implies a certain stabilisation
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of the working mechanisms, without however allowing a complete institutionalisation
of the political system. The official objective of this strategy is to provide the country
with  the  stability  necessary  for  it  to  succeed  in  its  economic  development  and  to
impose itself on the world scene as power of the very first rank—the familiar fuqiang of
Chinese modernisers in the nineteenth century. Economic development, international
power and nationalism, stability and modernisation of  the state,  these are the four
main foundations of the legitimacy of the present Chinese regime.
10 This combination of modernisation with adaptation has engendered numerous reforms:
• the large-scale training of more competent cadres, in China and abroad;
• the creation of a civil service, which, although directed by the CP, enjoys a number of
safeguards which assure its stability and efficiency;
• the transformation of government institutions (ministries, commissions, local offices, etc.)
into organisations no longer in charge of directly managing the enterprises they control, but
responsible for the implementation of public policy in their sector of intervention;
• the establishment of national and local administrative systems on Western lines (taxation,
banking, social security, stock exchange controls, etc.), some of which, in particular the tax
reform of 1994, contributed to recentralising the state to a certain extent and to building a
“modern state”;
• the re-establishment and diversification of the organisations for the control of the Party-
state, of leading cadres and of corruption (the CP’s disciplinary inspection commissions, the
Ministry of Control, the Public Prosecutor’s Offices, the State Audit Administration, etc.);
• the reintroduction of formal political institutions of Soviet inspiration (particularly the
people’s congresses), and the transfer to these institutions, whose elections are however still
directed by the CP, of a limited number of powers (e. g. the people’s congresses have a
particular influence on the legislative process)11;
• the introduction of more or less pluralist elections on the edges of the system (village
committees, then urban committees) and the launching of certain experiments at the basic
level of the administration, the township and the town12;
• the simplification of administrative procedures and the improvement of relations between
the state and its citizens (a typical example is the easier issuing of passports);
• the introduction of legal rules and of institutions which make it possible to provide a certain
legal protection to Chinese citizens as well as to foreign investors, a process which has
speeded up since China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in December
200113;
• the reactivation or the expansion of institutions of extra-judicial appeal, aimed at settling
conflicts within society or between society and the state; organisations for arbitration,
mediation or conciliation, complaints offices (xinfangke)14;
• and the proliferation of opinion polls (the results of which are often kept secret) aimed at a
better understanding of the state of mind of the citizen, of a locality or of a particular social
category (with the help of semi-private institutions such as Horizon, Lingdian zhibiao, etc.).
11 Reading the list,  it is clear that this modernisation has not been merely a technical
adaptation to globalisation and to the WTO, but has also pursued much more directly
political  objectives:  better  management  of  growing  socio-economic  inequalities,
assuring the stability of society as well as reinforcing the domestic and international
legitimacy of the regime. Thus the introduction on the margins of consultative and
electoral  mechanisms  seeks  both  to  reduce  social  tensions  and  to  improve  China’s
image.  Similarly,  the development of  legal,  administrative or ad hoc  ways of  appeal
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available to society can be interpreted as the application of the principle, cherished by
Deng Xiaoping,  according  to  which  “stability  comes  before  all  else”  (wending  yadao
yiqie). In other words, both domestically and on the international scene, the Chinese
government tries above all to head off conflict and avoid confrontation, in order, they
hope, to remain in control of the game.
12 However,  this  combination  of  modernisation  and  adaptation  has  been  much  less
thought through and much less the product of a grand design, than some might have
believed. It has also been reactive and has sought to accommodate the less dangerous
or destabilising demands of society (or of foreign partners), the better to preserve what
is essential—control by the CP of political power and of the vision of the future of the
country.
13 It  is  in  this  line  of  thinking  that  one  can  place  part  of  the  legal  reforms  and  the
widening  of  certain  public  freedoms.  In  fact,  since  1997,  legal  reforms  and  the
establishment of the rule of law have substituted for “unattainable political reforms”
and have to some extent become political reforms by default. Hence pressures from
society, and sometimes government concessions in this area. In this regard, the case of
Sun Zhigang in the spring of 2003, underscores the new and very relative flexibility of
the Chinese government. Sun was a young migrant worker arrested in Canton during
an identity check who died in custody after being ill-treated by other prisoners. His
death led, under pressure from local lawyers and decided by Wen Jiabao in person, to a
partial liberalisation of the restrictions affecting the residence rights of migrants to the
cities.
14 It  is  unquestionable  that  this  combination of  modernisation and adaptation by  the
political system has favoured a certain institutionalisation of the system. The regularity
of CP congresses and plenary sessions, of meetings of the National People’s Congress or
of  local  people’s  congresses is  one  of  the  most  visible  manifestations  of  this.  The
constitutional procedures and the working regulations of state institutions are formally
respected, more frequently invoked and more transparent15. And, particularly since the
promulgation of the Legislation Law in 2000 (lifafa), the hierarchy of legal norms has
gradually become clearer16.
15 However,  this institutionalisation, in the framework of the present political  system,
will remain by definition incomplete. The submission of the state to the CP (dangzheng
yitihua)  and  the  largely  opaque  and  undemocratic  character  of  the  latter,  despite
intentions outlined vaguely by Hu Jintao since 2003, though more clearly since 2004,
make it difficult to institutionalise a certain number of decision-making processes and
of  relations  between organisations17:  the  appointment  of  leading national  and local
cadres (still decided by co-option on the basis of multiple and complex consultations),
relations between the centre and the provinces (and between local government and the
various  levels)18,  the  “parliamentary”  role  of  the  Central  Committee,  the  modes  of
decision (vote or consensus?) within the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee
(which has nine members), as well as the process of political succession. For example,
while some local people’s congresses, despite being dominated still by CP cadres, have
sometimes tried and succeeded in making choices which were not those that the Party
had officially decided on, such cases remain exceptional. Similarly, while the CP will
hesitate to appoint an overly unpopular secretary or governor, it still has mastery over
the nomination process since it controls the nursery from which it can draw the cadres
it needs. Lastly, the maintenance of Jiang Zemin at the head of the Central Military
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Commission for two years after the CP’s sixteenth Congress (in October 2002) shows the
difficulties  involved  in  the  institutionalisation  of  the  highest  positions:  it  was  the
changes in the balance of power between Hu Jintao and his detractors (the Shanghai
group and others close to Jiang) which constrained the former President to retire in
September 2004.
16 However, complete institutionalisation of the regime is not the Chinese leadership’s
first priority. Rather they have concentrated simultaneously on the ad hoc but swift
management  of  social  conflicts  in  an  economic  environment  which  is  increasingly
inegalitarian, the appropriation by the state or by CP leading cadres’ families of the
most  vital,  dynamic  or  promising  sectors  of  economic  activity  and  the  nationalist
protection  of  those  sectors  from the  effects  of  market  mechanisms,  as  well  as  the
establishment of a sort of “alliance” which some would call a “class alliance” with the
country’s  elites,  and the  new elites  in  particular,  in  order,  among other  things,  to
dissuade them from engaging in  any democratic  transition.  This  wager  is  far  from
being a certitude, and one may well wonder whether, in the end, it will prove to have
been  in  vain,  so  great  is  the  diversification  of  interests  produced  by  the  present
economic  expansion.  However,  it  is  important  to  emphasise  the  fact  that,  for  the
moment, by exhibiting what constitutes in the eyes of the urban elites the foil of a
“beggars’ revolt”, reinforced by the persistent symbiosis between the Party and the
economic  sphere,  this  strategy  has  borne  its  fruit:  the  alliance  between  the  CP’s
leadership and the elites is holding and seems even to be growing stronger, thanks to
the  establishment  of  a  political  system  which  is  both  more  consultative  and  more
elitist.
A consultative but elitist authoritarianism
17 The  Chinese  political  system  remains  authoritarian,  but  the  regime  has  sought,
particularly since Tiananmen, to noticeably adjust its authoritarianism in view of the
social category it targets. It has pursued a controlled process of liberalisation and has
increased the number of informal processes of consulting with society and in particular
its elites. Lastly, it has sought to avoid alienating any of the new elites, even going so
far as to welcome so-called private or semi-private entrepreneurs into the CP. 
18 This adjustment of Chinese authoritarianism is still a fallow field of research. Some may
find this notion hardly relevant. And yet, one has to acknowledge that the government
now claims a privileged representation of the elites. This is the true meaning of the
“theory” of the three representations (sange daibiao) which was made public by Jiang
Zemin in 2001: the Party represents the productive forces and advanced culture much
better than society as a whole; it therefore defends the interests of the former more
directly  than the  interests  of the  latter.  Taking up a  Confucianist  tradition several
thousand  years  old,  this  elitist  approach  to  the  social  body  also  has  concrete
ramifications: the government has deliberately allowed cells of freedom of expression
to develop within certain privileged categories of society, or rather danwei (production
units), on condition, of course, that this freedom is not used to communicate publicly
with society as a whole. This is the case first of all with the economic nomenklatura, the
country’s “plutocracy”, the sons and daughters of leaders who directly control many
state  or  quasi-state  enterprises:  despite  regular  campaigns  against  corruption,  the
latter often remain above the law, protected by the norms and customs of the Party19.
This  is  also  the  case  with  the  universities  and  research  centres  where  academic
freedom has made great progress in the last few years, without the debates that are
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developing there being reported by the People’s  Daily (which no-one reads anymore
anyway),  or  the  country’s  other  official  publications.  Similarly,  the  demands  of
students (protests against the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade and lack of
security on campus) are quickly taken into account, even if not always satisfied. One
could  say  the  same,  mutatis  mutandis,  of  the  demands  of  private  or  semi-private
entrepreneurs on local authorities over whom they exercise growing power. In general,
the Chinese elites enjoy privileged access to information, particularly if they can speak
English well. In other words, tomorrow’s elites are being pampered by the government.
19 In contrast, the CP’s tolerance is much more limited with regard to worker and peasant
circles,  or  complainants  with  no  education.  Social  movements  (such  as  strikes  or
demonstrations)  are  indeed less  often (and less  severely)  banned than formerly—in
reality, the rapid increase in their number makes any interdiction illusory—, but the
leaders are still subject to uncompromising repression, in particular if the mobilisation
takes a political  turn (cf.  the events in Liaoyang in 2002).  Similarly,  the fluctuating
repression  of  the  quality  press,  such  as  the  Nanfang  dushibao  (Southern  Metropolitan
Journal) in the spring of 2004, shows the nervousness of the government as soon as the
new elites try communicating too freely with society. Moreover, this modulation has
obvious limits: any public and organised heterodox political action is still  forbidden
and immediately repressed, wherever it may come from (for example the creation of an
independent political party).
20 In parallel, in order to win the confidence of the elites, the government seeks their
advice and opinion on a growing number of questions. The consultation of experts has
in fact become one of the essential sources of the legitimacy of the present regime20.
These experts, and the centres and universities that harbour them, are caught in this
game,  competing  to  obtain  and  maintain  access  to  the  ears  of  the  leadership  and
claiming proudly an often disproportionate influence on government decision-making
processes.
21 It  is  not  a  question here  of  denigrating the  usefulness  of  these  consultations:  they
undeniably increase the quality of decisions and contribute to a revalorisation of the
role of experts at the expense of political leaders, who remain generalists for the most
part,  in  spite  of  what  in  most  cases  is  their  technical  training  (in  engineering  in
particular).  But  because  of  this,  these  consultations  tend  to  neglect  the  opinion  of
society as a whole, while giving these counsellors the illusion of taking part in decisions
that are still made elsewhere.
22 It is true that the CP as an institution is neither monolithic nor outside society. The
economic  reforms  and  globalisation  have  forced  it  to  negotiate  more  and  more
frequently with forces (both domestic and trans-national) that it does not control, and
in  whose  eyes  it  has  to  renew  and  reinforce  its  legitimacy  (whence  Jiang’s  “three
representations”). This prolonged haggling has affected and transformed it, both on a
structural level and where its cadres and members are concerned. While it continues to
co-opt  its  leaders,  the  methods  of  their  selection  have  changed:  economic  results,
“good government” and the peaceful management of conflict have become important
criteria for promotion21. Above all the interweaving of the Party’s interests with those
of the new elites—if only in the common objective of creating jobs—is so strong that it
is increasingly difficult for it to backtrack and regain the ground lost in the economic
and social spheres. The dismantling of a large part of loss-making state industry and
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the proliferation of charitable organisations are realities that are now accepted by the
government (which nevertheless still tries to supervise the latter’s activities).
23 It  remains  true  however,  that  the  political  heights  of  the  regime—as  well  as  the
economic  ones  (vital  sectors  such  as  energy,  weapons,  transport,  media  and
construction)—remain the monopoly of the communist institution and it is difficult to
see this monopoly crumbling away—except in the case of a major social or economic
crisis which is precisely what the present authorities strive by all means to curb, and
have so far succeeded in avoiding. One can also consider that the projects for partial
democratisation of the workings of the CP are aimed at increasing the cohesion of the
structure and will probably contribute to this. While within the Party there are indeed
those who favour a clearer liberalisation of the system, they do not seem ready to take
the risk of a break, and thus a schism, from their more conservative comrades, for they
are too closely tied to them by a multiplicity of  plutocratic connections.  Moreover,
there is no sign within the more autonomous elites, of movements powerful enough to
organise a move away from the present political (and economic) model. In other words,
the Chinese Communist Party has adopted a deliberately corporatist strategy, which for
the moment is succeeding22. At the risk of being over-simplistic, one might be tempted
to assert that in the years to come, the largest segments of these elites, in particular the
economic and cultural elites, closely tied to the Party as they are, will remain engaged
in  their  personal  enrichment,  the  improvement  of  their  well-being  and  the
enlargement  of  their  individual  or  categorical  freedoms.  The  political  elites  (in
particular the cadres) will try to make the most of the adjustments introduced by Hu
Jintao  in  the  rules  of  co-option  within  the  CP,  in  order  to  advance  their  careers
satisfactorily. Both kinds of elites will continue to mobilise only intermittently around
the great nationalist questions in order to influence the government (Taiwan, Senkaku,
etc.).
A difficult move away from the authoritarian model
24 Can  this  novel  mixture  of  flexible  authoritarianism,  of  elitism  and  of  selective
liberalisation last? The answer is “yes”. What could make things change? A major social
or economic crisis would undeniably be likely to divide the Party and encourage some
of its leaders to propose a democratic transition23. But, on the one hand, such a crisis is
far from being as probable as was predicted by Gordon Chang in 200124. On the other
hand, would the supporters of democracy prevail? Nothing is less certain, given the
extent to which the previous crises have generally favoured the most conservative and
nationalist forces in the Party, particularly if foreign governments began showing their
preferences. The extent of the social, economic, financial and demographic, as well as
institutional and legal problems to be solved, the answers to which are not to be found
in the “lucky bag” of democracy, are already inciting the Chinese elites to prudence.
The evolution of intellectual debate during the 1990s is evidence of this25. Moreover,
despite the well-known weaknesses of the present economic system (state enterprises,
the banking system, agriculture, environment protection), the Chinese Party-state has
reformed and modernised itself with much clearer success than the Soviets managed,
making many believe in its ability to stand up to the costs and the impact of accession
to the WTO, particularly thanks to the introduction, limited to say the least, of market
mechanisms.  Also  the  deep elitism of  the  Chinese  elites,  their  massive  support  for
Confucian values which are now openly promoted by the Party, their terror in the face
of the impossible reduction and the tricky management of socio-economic inequalities
and  their  nationalism  (in  particular  economic),  could  persuade  them  to  continue
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turning their backs on any democratisation of the present system, particularly if the
latter guarantees them, due to their privileged social position, de facto enjoyment of
the main basic freedoms which they dreamed of, say, at the time of Tiananmen.
25 It is true that the idea of democracy is making headway in China, that the Western
democratic  model  and  the  Taiwanese  experiment  appeal  to  a  growing  number  of
Chinese  irritated  by  the  corruption  among  the  leadership,  the  lack  of  pluralist
elections, the persistent censorship of the media and of the Internet, by the serious
breaches of human rights and the profound weaknesses of the legal system. Moreover,
one cannot rule out that one day, a major segment of the governing political elite will
realise that the democratic system and the rule of law which is tightly bound to it—
because  the  system  is  really  institutionalised  and  therefore  stable—manages
inequalities and social conflict much better than other political systems. But this idea
still  remains very much on the sidelines of present political debates, much more so
than for example in Taiwan, where, even under Chiang Kai-shek, almost all the leaders
of local authorities (towns, xian, townships, villages) were elected, and while opposition
parties  were  banned,  non-Party  figures  (dangwai)  could  participate  in  political  life.
Because of this, the mainland’s political (and economic) system remains more tightly
controlled  by  its  leading  party  and  there  is  no  major  reason  to  go  beyond
authoritarianism26. In these circumstances, will the supporters of democracy in China
take the risk of confronting and provoking the government, without any impetus from
the top? Should one not add that the increasing power of the urban middle classes, the
persistent economic privileges of the communist or para-communist nomenklatura, as
well as the affirmation of state corporatism rather make up additional factors in favour
of prudence by the elites in the confrontation which could appear in the event of a
social or economic crisis?
26 In other words, the numerous economic and social but also international constraints—
strengthening its rank vis-à-vis the United States—which China must overcome, as well
as the “class” interests of the political and economic elites which govern the country,
militate against a move away from authoritarianism any time soon. It cannot be ruled
out that the changes within the system, which we have presented, might eventually
favour a change of system. However, must the move to a different system necessarily
translate  into  a  transition  to  democracy,  in  2020  or  even  earlier,  as  some  are
predicting?27 Is  it  not  possible  that  China will  once  again  innovate  and manage its
retreat  from  communism  through  a  movement  towards  a  softer  but  stabilised
authoritarianism that is consultative yet also elitist and corporatist and equipped with
a certain legal modernity but not with the rule of law and only partly institutionalised?
In  short,  might  China  not  be  moving  towards  what  I  would  be  tempted  to  call
“enlightened” but plutocratic authoritarianism?
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ABSTRACTS
Since the launch of the reforms in 1979, most striking has been China’s tremendous ability to
adapt to—and therefore to resist—the Communist Party, its leadership and its nomenklatura, as
an institution exercising political power in a monopolistic fashion and seeking to preserve this
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monopoly while maintaining an increasingly plutocratic grip on the most strategic segments of
the economy. Moreover the numerous social and economic as well as international constraints—
such as maintaining its position vis-à-vis the United States—which China must overcome, as well
as the “class” interests of the political and economic elites that lead the country, militate against
any  quick  escape  from  authoritarianism.  That  changes  introduced  within  the  system  might
eventually favour a change of system cannot be ruled out. However, does a move to another
system necessarily translate into a transition to democracy? Is it not possible that China might
once  again  innovate  and  succeed  in  emerging  from  communism  by  means  of  an  evolution
towards a more flexible but stabilised authoritarianism, consultative yet elitist and corporatist,
endowed with a certain legal  modernity but not with the rule of  law and still  only partially
institutionalised? In short, might not China be evolving towards what I would be tempted to call
“enlightened” but plutocratic authoritarianism?
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